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Mr. Rector-Magnificus, my distinguished listeners!
Who cares about privacy?
“Who cares about privacy?” That’s what Frank Kuitenbrouwer 
asked in an article in the NRC newspaper of 15 September 
2007.1 The main reason for considering this question was an 
article by two young researchers at this university, who had 
the temerity to say that privacy legislators were being too 
ambitious, that the scope of the privacy law was too broad, and 
that the rules of this law were sometimes too vague.2
“It shows audacity to call the privacy laws too ambitious,” said 
Kuitenbrouwer. “Will that ever apply to fundamental rights?
Even now this question is still relevant. At this moment new 
privacy or data protection law3 is in the making in Brussels. 
As a case in point, there is a proposal to widen the scope 
of this law. The current privacy law applies to data about 
persons whose identity is known or may be known. In the new 
proposal, this law should also apply to data that singles out, or 
differentiates, one person from another, without their identity 
being known. 
This proposal is ambitious, and yes, perhaps even too 
ambitious. If the privacy law is to apply to all data which 
distinguishes one person from another, it will be hard to 
imagine situation in which the privacy law will not apply. The 
criteria for use of the law will be so ill-defined (that is to say, to 
ability to single out one individual from another) that its scope 
will almost be unlimited. One could call this the watering 
down or dilution of the privacy law. 
Is this a bad thing? It is about fundamental rights, isn’t it? It is a 
bad thing precisely because it is about fundamental rights. The 
consequence will be that we will somehow have to limit the 
scope of the law, and that will result in legal uncertainty. And 
this is what will make data protection and privacy law harder 
to apply than it already is.
This afternoon I will discuss the scope of data protection law, 
using IP addresses as an example. The question to be discussed 
is whether or not data protection law applies, or should apply, 
to IP addresses. This question, and the different answers that 
have been given in the recent past, provide insight into the 
lawmaker’s aims and into the roles of privacy regulators. And 
this is what I would like to discuss with you today.
I will start with a short lecture on what personal data really are. 
A short lecture on the concept of personal data 
The privacy law applies to all personal data. Personal data are: 
“any information relating to an identified or an identifiable 
natural person”. This is the definition given by the European 
Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC.4 
The term ‘identifiable’, refers to “[a] person who can be 
identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to 
an identification number or to one or more factors specific to 
his physical, physiological, mental, economic, cultural or social 
identity”.
From this it is difficult to assert exactly what the lawmaker 
means by the term ‘identifiable’. It does say how to identify 
an individual: that can be done by the use of a number, or 
else through the recognition of certain features of someone’s 
identity. The issue is if the person or organization that controls 
personal data (we call this person ‘the controller’), or any 
other person using resources at his disposal, can within reason 
determine an individual’s identity. 
From Directive’s recitals,5 from parliamentary documents 
accompanying the Dutch Data Protection Act6 and their 
associated literature,7 I distil three important aspects.
Allow me to explain them:
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1. Identity. The first aspect is the identity of the person 
associated with the personal data (we call this person ‘the data 
subject’). The term ‘personal data’ applies when it is possible 
to use the data to ascertain the data subject’s identity. Data 
are not personal data just because they say something about 
an individual, even uniquely so, rather because they refer to 
someone whose identity is known or can be known. 
A telephone number, a number plate or a fingerprint are not 
in themselves personal data. But they may become so when 
combined with other data, such as with names and addresses 
from a telephone book, the names from the vehicle registry 
or a fingerprint database. This is because, with the exception 
of instances of spontaneous recognition, it is only through 
combining these different data that it possible to identify 
someone.8 
I call this the ‘aspect of identity’.
2. Reasonableness. Second is the aspect of reasonableness. 
There can only be personal data if it doesn’t cost a 
disproportionate amount of effort to ascertain the data 
subject’s identity. If it does take a disproportionate amount of 
effort to ascertain the data subject’s identity, while taking into 
account the means of identification that are at hand, there can 
be no identifiability. If this is the case, then the data are not 
personal data. The mere theoretical possibility of identifying 
someone is therefore insufficient to qualify data as personal 
data. It should not take an unreasonable amount of effort to 
do so.9
3. Relativity. The third aspect is one of relativity. In other 
words, some data may be deemed to be personal data to 
one person, whereas to another, the same data, at the same 
time, may not be deemed as such. The difference in aspect 
is determined by the possibilities that one person has, and 
another person not has, when trying to ascertain the data 
subject’s identity.10 
The aspect of relativity stands in relation to the aspect of 
reasonableness. A reasonable amount of effort for one does not 
have to be the same for another. 
Perhaps an example can clarify this. 
I have here a glass with a fingerprint on it. You can’t see it, 
but I can. That fingerprint is not mine. I have not touched 
the glass because, as you can see, I’m holding it with a 
tissue. We don’t know whose fingerprint it is. And that is 
why this fingerprint, even though it is certainly unique to 
a particular individual, is not personal data. This is what is 
meant by the identity aspect. 
Perhaps someone can be identified using fingerprint, by 
a fingerprint database for example. But you or I cannot 
do this. We have no access to this database. Therefore, for 
us, it would demand an unreasonable amount of effort 
to determine the identity of the owner of the fingerprint. 
The aspect of reasonableness says that we do not have to 
treat this fingerprint, as personal data. And that is a good 
thing, as it would make doing the dishes unnecessarily 
complicated.
Obviously, this could be different for the National 
Forensics Institute in The Hague. I expect that the forensic 
specialists there have access to a fingerprint database. And 
without exercising an amount of unreasonable effort, 
these people can probably determine whose fingerprint it 
is. In that case, the fingerprint is personal data. But only 
for the institute, and not for us. That is what is meant by 
the aspect of relativity.
These three aspects make the definition of personal data 
dynamic and dependent on context. What may, at a given time, 
in a given situation, for a given individual be deemed to be 
personal data, may in another situation and for another person 
not be deemed as such. The three aspects determine when data 
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protection law applies, and in which situations. They make the 
law useful and give it meaning, and they contribute towards 
its effectiveness. In that sense these aspects are essential for the 
application of data protection or privacy law.
But at the same time it is these aspects that make the definition 
of personal data so complicated. In some cases it is hard to 
determine if personal data is involved. It always depends. And 
that is what always makes things difficult. 
That ends my short lecture on the definition of personal data. 
I will now continue with the question of whether IP addresses 
should be considered personal data.
Are IP addresses personal data, or not?
IP addresses are the numbers assigned to Internet Service 
Providers (ISPs), which in turn assign them to their 
subscribers’ computers, tablets and smartphones. IP addresses 
allow these devices to be found and recognized on the 
internet.11
So are IP addresses personal data or not? Often they are - but 
often they are not. It depends. Your IP address is personal 
data to your ISP. Why? Because your ISP can determine 
your identity without that much effort. Your ISP can do this 
because it has information about you, the subscriber, which 
corresponds to that particular IP address. So you can be 
identified by the ISP through your computer’s IP address. 
This may be different, however, if other people, such as your 
children, family members or roommates, use the same internet 
connection. It is unlikely that your ISP, or anyone else, will be 
able to determine the identity of these other users. And in that 
sense IP address is not personal data, not even for your ISP. 
Your ISP will not be able to identify the users with the help of 
its subscription data. The same thing happens when you make 
use of ‘free internet’ in the train or in the lounges at Schiphol 
Airport. 
So, IP addresses are often personal data, but often they are not. 
It always depends.12
For a long time this take on IP addresses went undisputed, but 
this appears about to change. In particular, data protection 
authorities (DPAs) are playing a role that we without 
hesitation can call important. At first they agreed that IP 
addresses often qualified as personal data, and often as not. At 
this present moment they believe that IP addresses always and 
by definition must be qualified as personal data, and must at 
least be treated accordingly. 
This is an important development. It is worth our while to 
consider why. 
At the beginning of this century, the European consultative 
body of national data protection authorities, the so-called 
Article 29 Working Party, published a document on internet 
privacy. In this publication the Working Party determined that 
many IP addresses are only personal data for ISPs if the ISPs 
systematically record the dates, times and durations of use of 
the IP addresses. The idea was that, with this data, they could 
determine the internet users’ identity without an unreasonable 
amount of effort.
The Working Party remarked that this would only apply to 
ISPs, and not to anyone else. There are occasions when it is 
possible to associate IP addresses with other data. However 
according to the Working Party that doesn’t alter the 
identifiability of the internet user. It stated: “… it might not be 
possible to identify a user in all cases and by all Internet actors 
from the data processed on the Internet”. In reference to the 
aspects of reasonability and relativity, the Working Party stated 
that IP addresses therefore often do not qualify as personal 
data.13 
The Dutch DPA, the College Bescherming Persoonsgegevens, 
agreed with this point of view. At around the same time, the 
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authority released a press statement with the compelling title: 
“An IP address is not always personal data”.14 
In subsequent years, however, it has turned out that copyright 
holders in particular have been able to acquire subscriber 
information from ISPs through court applications. They were 
able to acquire information about subscribers corresponding 
to certain IP addresses where there was a suspicion that 
copyrighted material was being uploaded onto the internet. 
Consequently, these copyright holders could identify those 
subscribers. In such cases, according to an opinion of the 
Working Party published in 2007, these IP-addresses are 
personal data.15
Obviously, one could ask whether or not initiating such 
court procedures do not indeed qualify as a disproportionate 
amount of effort. Nonetheless, it is clear that the Working 
Party recognized that IP addresses are not always personal data 
as regards the aspect of reasonableness. The Working Party 
mentioned the internet café as an example: quite often in internet 
cafés it is not possible to ascertain the identity of the users. 
So far nothing out of the ordinary. But then the Working Party 
came up with a different perspective, in - of all places - the 
very same advice. The Working Party determined that there is 
already identifiability when the use of the data “… is likely to 
have an impact on a certain person’s rights and interests, taking 
into account all the circumstances surrounding the precise case”. 
And further, “[i]t is sufficient if the individual may be treated 
differently from other persons as a result of the processing of such 
data”.16 
All of a sudden, for the Working Party it was no longer a 
matter ascertaining the identity of the individual involved, 
but rather whether an individual can be categorized, and 
whether “[i]t is possible to categorize this person on the basis of 
socio-economic, psychological, philosophical or other criteria and 
attribute certain decisions to him”.17 
It is most likely that the Working Party had in mind those 
internet users who cannot gain access to a particular 
website or service, because from their IP addresses it 
appears that they are from a certain country. You might be 
familiar with this if you have ever tried to watch a repeat 
of a television program on your computer in a foreign 
country. Quite often you can’t access the program. This 
is because of your IP address: you are treated differently 
from other users, and that’s without your identity even 
being known.18
In this interpretation of the concept of personal data, the 
Working Party ignores what I call the aspect of identity.19 And, 
contrary to what has sometimes been suggested,20 this means a 
radical new interpretation of the concept. 
In the same advice the Working Party seems to limit the 
interpretation of the aspect of reasonableness. In the case of 
internet café users, the Working Party feels that IP addresses 
should be treated as personal data after all, even though 
internet users cannot be traced without an unreasonable 
amount of effort. However, because it is unclear which users 
can, and which users cannot be identified, the Working Party 
maintains that IP addresses should always be treated as if they 
were personal data anyway. It is no longer important to the 
Working Party that it may take an unreasonable amount of 
effort to identify the user. The Working Party stated that one 
can only conclude that certain data such as IP addresses are not 
personal data when the ISP is in a position to distinguish ‘with 
absolute certainty’ that the data correspond to users that cannot 
be identified. 
Here we see that the Working Party ignores the aspect of 
identity, and later the aspect of reasonableness. Six months 
on, the Working Party also neglects the third aspect, that of 
relativity, the one that determines if data can be deemed to be 
personal or not. 
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In an advice on internet search engines, the Working Party 
admitted that “…[t]hough IP addresses in most cases are not 
directly identifiable by search engines,” and that “identification 
can be achieved by a third party ...” referring to ‘law 
enforcement and national security authorities’ and ‘private 
parties in some Member States’ (e.g. copyright holders). 
Because these third parties are considered to be able to 
ascertain the identities of users, the Working Party felt that 
search engines ‘consider’ IP addresses to be personal data, even 
if the search engines themselves do not have the means to 
identify data subjects. So the aspect of relativity no longer has 
any meaning to the Working Party either.21 
These and other opinions22 show that the Working Party now 
finds that IP addresses always qualify as personal data. And this 
is also the position that the Dutch DPA has taken. In a press 
release concerning the advice on search engines, the CBP stated 
quite clearly, that “now, unambiguously, it has been established 
that IP addresses are personal data”.23
Much has changed in the attitudes of regulators concerning 
personal data and IP addresses. At first, their developing 
views didn’t draw a lot of attention, perhaps because the 
Working Party’s opinions are not everyone’s bedtime 
reading. Nonetheless, from discussions about the new general 
regulation on data protection, we can see that regulators have 
started to expound their new dispositions with zest.
The proposal for a new regulation on data protection
The proposal for the new General DP Regulation is based on 
same definition of personal data as adhered to at present. In 
the proposal’s definition the criterion is whether someone can 
be identified or not. And reasonably means to that end still 
need to be available. The proposal recognizes that IP addresses 
can be used to identify individuals, but does emphasize that IP 
addresses are not personal data in every situation.24 
Amongst the reactions to the proposal, we can see that a digital 
rights group was the first to denounce this25 with regulators 
and politicians following later on.26 Their argument is that the 
regulation should apply when data is being processed from 
which individuals may be distinguished from others. For them 
it is no longer about identifying, but about individualizing, 
which is to say, ‘singling out’, or ‘isolating’ the individual.27 
An interesting point in all this is that the Working Party 
maintains that identification automatically encompasses 
individualization, thereby suggesting that IP addresses were 
always to be qualified as personal data, a notion that cannot 
stand in light of its previous opinions. Others simply argue 
that the definition of personal data should be broadened, so 
as to recognize that identifying and individualizing are not the 
same thing. 
Dilution of the privacy law
But what is one to think of that? What is one to think of 
broadening the definition of personal data? It might come as 
no surprise to you that I have some concerns in relation to this. 
I will now take you through five of these.
1. Limiting and defining. My first concern involves the three 
aspects I’ve just mentioned. In the Working Party’s broader 
definition of personal data, the aspect of identity has been 
left out altogether. Little or no value is given to the aspects 
of reasonableness and relativity. As a result the definition of 
personal data becomes less dependent on context and also less 
dynamic. At first glance this would seem appealing, implying 
that the question of whether or not personal data are involved 
is an easy one to answer: the answer will almost always be that 
personal data are involved. Or at least, it will not be possible 
to exclude this premise. Unsatisfactory answers such as “it 




In contrast, however, data protection law will apply in many 
situations where it is not needed. Exceptions will have to 
be made. Even the advocates of a broadened definition of 
personal data admit this. Because we are not at all certain 
that we can fit or work these exceptions into the law, more 
often than not we may expect reliance on what is called ‘a 
reasonable application of the law’ or else ‘a sensible and flexible 
application’ of it.28
This, in itself, is not new. Even the current data protection law 
sometimes goes far beyond its purpose. With the instrument of 
the ‘reasonable rendering of the law’, the Dutch DPA has made 
several attempts to bring the scope of the law back to what is 
still within reason. Up till now, these attempts in particular 
have introduced a lot of legal uncertainty, notwithstanding the 
captivating discussions they have generated.
Example no. 1. In its internet guidelines of December 
2007, the Dutch DPA found it within ‘a reasonable 
application of the law’ to consider recognizable photos 
and video images only as racial data (as specified in article 
16 of the Dutch Data Protection Act) if they are published 
with the explicit intent to make a racial distinction. 
However, in its decision of 23 March 2010 (LJN BK6331), 
the Dutch Supreme Court dismissed this interpretation.29
Example no. 2. The same internet guidelines mentioned 
several criteria to be used to determine if personal data 
are processed for journalistic purposes. A year after 
these guidelines were published, the criteria proved to be 
outdated after the decision by the Court of Justice of 16 
December 2008, in the Markkinapörssi case.30
Example no. 3. In the spring of 2009 the Dutch DPA came 
up with a limited interpretation of article 4(1) of the 
Dutch Data Protection Act that deals with the territorial 
scope of the law. A mere two years later, the Article 29 
Working Party came up with an opinion on the matter, 
which was, not surprisingly, a contrary view.31
It is important to know that data protection law already has 
many open concepts. It couldn’t be any other way because 
the law has to be applicable in many different situations. The 
privacy legislator presumed that these open concepts would 
be filled in by sectorial legislation, court decisions or self-
regulation.32 The official evaluations of data protection law, 
however, have shown that this has not happened.33 If only 
for this fact alone, I find it unwise to propose that in the next 
generation of data protection law definitions will be used that 
are even less distinct.
This is my first concern with regard to the broadening of the 
definition of personal data.
2. Foreseeability. A second concern deals with the foreseeability 
of the data protection law’s rules, which is to say foreseeability 
as the term has developed through case law of the European 
Court of Human Rights. A broadened or stretched-out 
definition of personal data means that in many situations it will 
not be so straightforward as to whether or not the law is to be 
applied, and what that will mean for the controllers and data 
subjects. The scope of the law will be indefinite, or at the least it 
will not be possible to define its scope with certainty.
This makes adhering to the law, and also enforcing it, highly 
perilous indeed. To enforce a rule, and to be able to impose a 
sanction on a violation of that rule, it must have been made 
clear to the violator beforehand what was expected of him 
and which rules were to apply. Broadening the definition of 
personal data will make this very difficult in many situations, if 
not impossible.34
3. What are the considerations? A third concern deals with 
the substantiation of the need to broaden the definition of 
personal data, or rather, with the lack of such substantiation.
At present there are rules concerning IP addresses.35 And 
indeed perhaps there are reasons to create more rules. And 
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perhaps there are reasons why the scope of the definition of 
personal data should be broadened even further. However, it is 
disturbing to think that the reasons for such broadening have 
either not been expressed at all or only cursorily.36 
The considerations as to why the definition of personal 
data should be broadened, are tenuous at best. LIBE-
rapporteur Albrecht is content with the mere justification 
that “[t]he concept of personal data is further clarified with 
objective criteria. Identifiers that have a close relation to a 
natural person must be regarded as personal data”.37
The so-called Elissen Resolution, as adopted by the Dutch 
parliament, requests that the government broaden the 
definition of personal data, because “the definition of 
personal data forms the nucleus of the new regulation […] 
and that this should be attained with utmost care”.38
The Working Party is limiting itself by referring to a selection 
of its own opinions and expressing its wish that DPAs should 
have a say in the use of IP addresses. These are teleological and 
authority arguments - in themselves not very convincing at all. 
“The reason is,” to paraphrase the Working Party and DPAs, 
“because we said so”, end of story.39 
It is also not very convincing that the reasons presented by the 
Working Party are largely based on assumptions. One is that 
data protection law will offer more security and safeguards, 
simply by enlarging the scope. Is this actually the case? Would 
it really be that simple? I wonder. I think more is needed. 
Before we move on to expanding the scope of the law this 
should first be clarified. 
4. The system or principles of the law. My fourth concern is 
about the principles of the law itself.
Data protection law is itself based on the idea of identified 
individuals. If, for example, someone wants to make use of his 
or her subject access rights, the controller has to establish the 
identity of the one requesting access.40 This will be difficult - if 
not downright impossible - when it concerns access to data 
about individuals whose identity is unknown. What is the 
value of access rights in such a situation?
And what about informing the data subjects, one of the core 
obligations under the law? How can that be done when the 
data subjects are not known? 
5. Evaluations. A fifth, and for the moment at least, final 
concern, is about the evaluations of the law that I have already 
mentioned.
These show that the unclear definitions of legal terms are a 
major problem, potentially the greatest problem of the law. It 
is annoying, if not disturbing, to see that no attention is paid 
to these evaluations in the discussions on the definition of 
personal data.
But perhaps I’m taking all of this just a little too personally. 
You shouldn’t think that I’ve mentioned these evaluations 
because at the time I, along with my eLaw colleagues, 
contributed to them.42
I have highlighted but a handful of concerns. There are more. 
I could mention, for example, the subsidiarity principle,43 or 
else the legitimacy of the DPA’s decision-making. But I think 
you get the picture. It is not a good idea to simply broaden 
the scope of data protection law. There is a serious risk that 
this will lead to a dilution of data protection or privacy law, 
in the sense that the law will apply to everything and nothing, 
making it a law without meaning. We should not want that and 
neither should the legislator.
And with that I have come to the legislator’s aims.
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The privacy legislator’s aim
When it comes to privacy, the privacy legislator has always 
been ambitious. The privacy legislator lays down rules for all 
sorts of activities: the very mundane as well as the common; 
for the important and the unimportant; for all kinds of 
social, cultural and economic activities. In the information 
society everyone, bar none, has to deal with privacy and data 
protection law. If not as a data subject whose data is being 
processed, then as the controller who determines how that is to 
be done.
Privacy and data protection law is about fundamental rights. 
And this is the reason why a lot of attention should be paid 
towards the quality of its rules. My point is that one should 
expect data protection law to be comprehensible, much more 
so than what we might find acceptable with other laws. At any 
rate, considerable attention should be given to the means by 
which its as yet undefined concepts are defined and clarified.
If this were a law that was relevant only to a handful of people, 
the legislator could perhaps allow itself to think up rules 
that are less easy to comprehend. For those parties involved 
- including regulatory authorities, courts and judges - it 
is to be expected that they take the trouble to understand 
them. For instance, we may expect telecom providers to 
delve into the incomprehensibilities of telecoms-law-related 
cost-orientation requirements.44 And if that takes any effort, 
it will not be insurmountable, given the limited number of 
telecoms providers there are and the available resources at their 
disposal.45
As for privacy and data protection, this is different. Data 
protection law concerns us all, which is why this law should 
be understandable to us all. The definitions used should be 
evident without needing an unreasonable amount of effort to 
try to understand them. If there were such a thing as law not 
meant for ‘specialists’ or ‘super specialists’, then it should be 
data protection law.46 
The desire to broaden the definition of personal data is at odds 
with this. The aims of the legislator should not be to widen the 
scope of the law to infinity and beyond, but rather to make it 
more comprehensible, useable and workable; to make it easier 
to regulate and enforce. Only then can it do what it is meant to 
do, namely to protect our privacy.
And the role of the data protection authorities
I’ve already said a lot already on data protection authorities. 
You may have got the impression that I do not appreciate what 
they are doing.
That is not the case.
The Dutch DPA, perhaps one of the best data protection 
authorities in the Netherlands, has assumed the role of 
explaining data protection law. As a case in point, the DPA 
has contributed significantly to clarifying the law. And that, of 
course, demands our respect. 
But clarifying and explaining data protection law is not an easy 
task. A DPA that wishes to be credible should do its utmost 
to explain its reasoning, or at least it shouldn’t mind doing 
so. And that is exactly what is missing in the discussion on 
personal data and IP addresses. The Dutch DPA is hesitant to 
admit that its position is subject to an ongoing process, and it 
is reluctant to explain why its views have changed.
This is very unfortunate indeed, as it makes a worthwhile 
discussion unnecessarily complicated and a serious debate 
impossible. To allow for a convincing contribution to 
explanation and clarification of data protection law, the DPA 
must allow for a meaningful discussion of its standpoints and 
their evolution in a wider arena, so not only with other DPAs 
and others who are like-minded.
Privacy is ours. The discussion about privacy concerns all of 
us. For those who care about privacy, this is self-explanatory. 




And so I come to the end of this lecture. According to the 
instructions I have received, it is customary - but not required 
- that at the end of his inaugural lecture, the professor express 
his gratitude, which I shall gladly do.1
I would like to thank the Executive Board of the University 
and the Board of the Faculty, the Rector Carel Stoker, in 
particular, and the Dean Rick Lawson, for the trust they have 
placed in me. I would also like to thank everyone else who has 
contributed to my appointment.
I will follow in the footsteps of Hans Franken and Aernout 
Schmidt. From my first tentative steps into the world of 
academia they have been - and indeed still are - my great, and 
often inimitable, examples. Hans, Aernout, many thanks!
I also owe my thanks to my other eLaw colleagues. I shall no 
doubt be leaving out a lot of people, but I hope that by naming 
a few I will make good on this shortcoming. In no particular 
order these are: Bart, Bibi, Franke, Jaap, Jan-Jaap, Martijn, Rob, 
Tess, Wouter, and of course Simone with whom I share the 
professorial chair.
It is not an easy thing to strike a balance between my work 
as a lawyer and my academic activities. I am grateful to my 
colleagues at Bird & Bird for having given me the opportunity 
to allow me to do both for more than twelve years already. I 
will doubtless be missing out on a lot of people once again, 
but I would like to name two in particular: Marjolein Geus 
and Ella Meijaard, who in their own ways have both been 
instrumental to my well-being at the office. 
I am pleased to see in the audience several students who are 
following the courses in telecoms law and internet law. I look 
forward to exploring with you what can be done, what has to 
be done, and what should be done in the information society. 
You may not realize it, but there is a great demand for legal 
professionals with this specific branch of knowledge.
Last, but by no means least, my thanks also go, of course, to 
my family, especially those sitting here in the front row. For 
reasons involving protection of my and their privacy, I shall 
not go into details. At least not from this pulpit.
Querida Geidy, por razones de privacidad no puedo explicarlo 
ahora, pero sabes que estoy muy feliz de que estés aqui, porque 
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